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IMPOSING A DAILY BURDEN ON THOUSANDS OF
INNOCENT CITIZENS: THE SUPREME COURT
UNNECESSARILY LIMITED MOTORISTS’ FOURTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN KANSAS V. GLOVER

GEORGE M. DERY*
ABSTRACT
This Article analyzes Kansas v. Glover, in which the Supreme
Court ruled that an officer could stop a vehicle owned by a person
having a revoked license on the assumption that the owner was currently driving the vehicle. This work examines the concerns created
by Glover’s ruling. This Article asserts that, in creating its new rule
enabling police to stop a motorist without first confirming his or her
identity, the Court based its holding on the existence of two facts,
thus effectively changing its traditional “totality of the circumstances”
analysis for reasonable suspicion to a categorical rule. Further,
Glover’s reasoning eroded Terry v. Ohio’s reasonable suspicion standard and discounted the motorist’s interests against seizures of the
person, thus undermining Fourth Amendment rights. Finally, the
Court, in adding a new element of “when the officer lacks information negating an inference” to Terry’s analysis, shifted the burden
of proof for assessing the lawfulness of the seizure to the motorist.
Glover therefore potentially imposes a daily burden on “thousands
of innocent citizens” who happen to be borrowing a car.
INTRODUCTION
I. TERRY V. OHIO ALLOWED BRIEF INVESTIGATIVE STOPS WITHIN
SPECIFIC LIMITS
II. KANSAS V. GLOVER
A. Facts
B. The Court’s Opinion
III. CONCERNS CREATED BY GLOVER’S ANALYSIS
A. Glover Reduces Terry’s “Totality of the Circumstances”
Analysis to Only Two Facts, Effectively Changing the
Reasonable Suspicion Analysis to a Categorical Rule
B. Glover’s Reasoning Discounted Both Reasonable
Suspicion and the Motorist’s Interests Against Seizures
of the Person, Undermining Fourth Amendment Rights
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Glover Added a New Element of “When the Officer
Lacks Information Negating an Inference” to Terry’s
Justification Analysis, Shifting the Burden of Proof to
the Motorist

CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
In Kansas v. Glover, the Supreme Court ruled that an officer
could stop a vehicle owned by a person having a revoked license on
the assumption that the owner was currently driving the vehicle.1
The Court reached this holding with near unanimity, leaving Justice
Sotomayor as the lone dissenter.2 Justice Thomas, the author of
Glover’s majority opinion, considered resolution of the case’s issue
to be a simple matter of “common sense.”3 In her concurring opinion
supporting the Court’s holding, Justice Kagan declared, “When you
see a car coming down the street, your common sense tells you that
the registered owner may well be behind the wheel.”4
The general consensus behind Glover’s conclusion, however,
obscures the fact that the Court, in reaching its holding, made some
perilous logical leaps that unnecessarily undermined Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizures. While dutifully stating
that it was considering the “totality of the circumstances” to assess
reasonable suspicion for the vehicle stop,5 the Court actually based
its holding on the existence of two facts, thus effectively changing its
reasonable suspicion analysis to a categorical rule.6 Further, Glover’s
reasoning eroded Terry’s reasonable suspicion standard and discounted the motorist’s interests against seizures of the person, thus
undermining Fourth Amendment rights.7 Finally, Glover, in adding
a new element of “when the officer lacks information negating an inference” to Terry’s justification analysis, shifted the burden of proof
assessing the propriety of the seizure to the motorist.8 With such
reasoning, the Court does genuine damage beyond concluding that
1. Particularly, Kansas v. Glover held that an officer could perform a traffic stop of
a vehicle owned by a person having a revoked license when “the officer lacks information
negating an inference that the owner is the driver of the vehicle.” 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1186
(2020).
2. Id. at 1194 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting).
3. Id. at 1189–90.
4. Id. at 1191 (Kagan, J., concurring).
5. Id. at 1191.
6. Id. at 1190.
7. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1190.
8. Id. at 1186.
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police can stop drivers with revoked licenses. Indeed, Glover’s analysis
could impose a “potential daily burden on thousands of innocent citizens” who happen to be driving a borrowed car.9 The cost to a stopped
motorist, in some cases, can be dire, for “low-level traffic stops” have
been found to account for “an unnecessarily high number of use-offorce incidents.”10 Thus, in allowing officers to make traffic stops on
less than complete information available to them, Glover might have
employed flawed reasoning rather than “common sense.”11
I. TERRY V. OHIO ALLOWED BRIEF INVESTIGATIVE STOPS
WITHIN SPECIFIC LIMITS
The traffic stop in Glover is a kind of seizure of a person that
falls short of an arrest which the Court first recognized in Terry v.
Ohio.12 Terry hardly took its creation of an officer’s authority to perform a “stop and frisk” of a person lightly.13 The Court declared, “[w]e
would be less than candid if we did not acknowledge that this question thrusts to the fore difficult and troublesome issues.”14 The stakes
involved on both sides of the case were particularly significant.15
When considering the concerns of the individual, the Terry Court
warned, “[t]his inestimable right of personal security belongs as much
to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted
in his study to dispose of his secret affairs.”16 On the other hand, the
officer’s interests were also vital for, without the authority to perform a frisk, the answer to an officer’s question “may be a bullet.”17
The Court in Terry therefore closely scrutinized all the facts.18
Terry considered the entire career of Detective McFadden—the officer involved in the case—including the number of years he had
been an officer and as a detective, as well as his current assignment
looking out for “shoplifters and pickpockets” in this “vicinity of downtown Cleveland.”19 The Court also noted Detective McFadden’s
9. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 419 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10. Dave Davies Interview of Dr. Phillip Atiba Goff, Psychologist Examines What a
‘Rapid Evolution’ in Policing Might Look Like, NPR (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.npr
.org/2021/04/22/989767998/psychologist-examines-what-a-rapid-evolution-in-policing
-might-look-like [https://perma.cc/8KV5-NUJG].
11. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1189–90.
12. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968). The Court noted that the issues it weighed had
“never before been squarely presented to this Court.” Id. at 9–10.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 9.
15. Id. at 9–10.
16. Id. at 8–9.
17. Terry, 392 U.S. at 8.
18. 392 U.S. at 4–8.
19. Id. at 5.
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“routine habits of observation over the years.”20 In this particular
case, the detective noticed two men who were acting curiously; they
took turns walking past a store, looking in its window, continuing on
for a short distance, turning around and looking again in the store
window.21 Further, the “two men repeated this ritual alternately
between five and six times apiece—in all, roughly a dozen trips.”22
Each would confer with the other after walking past the store.23 After
a third man came and left, the original two “resumed their measured
pacing, peering and conferring” for about ten minutes.24 Detective
McFadden “suspected the two men of ‘casing a job, a stick-up,’” and
therefore feared they were armed with guns.25 He approached the
men, identified himself as an officer, and asked for their names.26
When the men “mumbled” their responses, the detective grabbed
Terry, patted him down, and found a gun.27
The Court framed the question presented by Detective
McFadden’s actions as “whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for
weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest.”28 Here, after
delving into all of the facts of the case, Terry determined that the
officer acted reasonably in stopping the suspects.29 The Court next
considered the search, or “frisk,” that then accompanied Detective
McFadden’s seizure of the men, noting,
there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer,
where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed
and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable
cause to arrest the individual for a crime.30
20. Id.
21. Id. at 6.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 6–7.
27. Id. at 7.
28. Id. at 15.
29. Specifically, the Court explained,
we consider first the nature and extent of the governmental interests
involved. One general interest is of course that of effective crime prevention
and detection; it is this interest which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even
though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. It was this legitimate
investigative function Officer McFadden was discharging when he decided
to approach petitioner and his companions.
Id. at 22.
30. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
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The Court deemed Detective McFadden’s actions fell within this “narrowly drawn authority,” and so were reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.31 Terry only reached this result after a deep analysis
of all the details presented in the case.32 Subsequent case law would
follow not only Terry’s holding but also its dedicated approach to
weigh all the facts in a case, mandating that, “the totality of the
circumstances—the whole picture—must be taken into account.”33
II. KANSAS V. GLOVER
A. Facts
The parties stipulated to the facts in Kansas v. Glover.34 While
patrolling on April 28, 2016, Deputy Mark Mehrer of the Douglas
County Kansas Sheriff’s Office observed Charles Glover Jr.’s pickup
truck.35 Deputy Mehrer ran the truck’s plate through the Kansas
Department of Revenue’s file service, which indicated that Glover,
the vehicle’s registered owner, had “a revoked driver’s license in the
State of Kansas.”36 Assuming that the registered owner was currently
driving the truck, Deputy Mehrer “did not attempt to identify the
driver.”37 Instead, based “solely on the information that the registered owner of the truck was revoked, Deputy Mehrer initiated a traffic stop.”38 As a result of the stop, Kansas charged Glover, who was
indeed the truck’s driver, with “driving as a habitual violator.”39 Arguing that Deputy Mehrer lacked reasonable suspicion for the traffic
stop, Glover moved to suppress the evidence seized during the stop.40
B. The Court’s Opinion
The Court deemed the issue in Glover to be “whether a police
officer violates the Fourth Amendment by initiating an investigative
traffic stop after running a vehicle’s license plate and learning that
the registered owner has a revoked driver’s license.”41 Glover held,
31. Id. at 27, 30–31.
32. Id. at 4–8, 22–23, 28.
33. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
34. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1187.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1186–87. Kansas charged Glover with violating KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8
-285(a)(3) (2001).
40. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1187.
41. Id. at 1186.
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“when the officer lacks information negating an inference that the
owner is the driver of the vehicle, the stop is reasonable.”42 While brief
traffic stops could not be made upon mere hunches, such seizures
were lawful when supported by reasonable suspicion.43 Reasonable
suspicion, which fell short of the standards for preponderance of the
evidence, probable cause, and scientific certainty,44 was a “matter of
common sense.”45 Since reasonable suspicion should not be “reduced
to ‘a neat set of legal rules,’” officers should not be burdened with
“pointing to specific training materials or field experiences” to justify
stops for traffic code violations.46 The Glover Court especially resisted
rigidity in applying reasonable suspicion in a context where states
had a “vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so
are permitted to operate motor vehicles [and] that licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements are being observed.”47
When it considered the “facts known to Deputy Mehrer at the
time of the stop,” the Glover Court determined they amounted to
reasonable suspicion.48 Before the traffic stop, Deputy Mehrer had
gathered the following facts: a person was “operating a 1995 Chevrolet 1500 pickup truck with Kansas plate 295ATJ,” the truck’s registered owner “had a revoked license,” and the “model of the truck
matched the observed vehicle.”49 These facts enabled Deputy Mehrer
to draw “the commonsense inference that Glover was likely the driver
of the vehicle.”50 The Court found Deputy Mehrer’s information exceeded the reasonable suspicion standard because the facts within
his possession provided “more than reasonable suspicion to initiate
the stop.”51 Glover thus concluded, “Deputy Mehrer possessed no exculpatory information—let alone sufficient information to rebut the
reasonable inference that Glover was driving his own truck—and
thus the stop was justified.”52 Quite simply, since Deputy Mehrer
knew that someone was driving a vehicle which was owned by a
person lacking a valid license, he could stop the truck without further investigation.53
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 1187.
Id. at 1187–88.
Id. at 1189–90.
Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1190.
Id. at 1188.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1191.
Id.
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III. CONCERNS CREATED BY GLOVER’S ANALYSIS
A. Glover Reduces Terry’s “Totality of the Circumstances” Analysis
to Only Two Facts, Effectively Changing the Reasonable Suspicion
Analysis to a Categorical Rule
In determining that Deputy Mehrer had reasonable suspicion
to stop Charles Glover, the Court spoke in absolute terms, deeming
drivers with revoked licenses to be “categorically unfit to drive.”54
Further, Glover based its determination on just two facts: (1) Deputy
Mehrer “knew that the license plate” he ran “was linked to a truck
matching the observed vehicle,” and that (2) “the registered owner
of the vehicle had a revoked license.”55 Based only on what the Court
itself described as “these minimal facts,” the officer could seize the
driver.56 Moreover, Glover ruled that an officer gained authority to
intrude upon a motorist when he or she lacked facts, for the Court
ruled, “when the officer lacks information negating an inference that
the owner is the driver of the vehicle, the stop is reasonable.”57 This
stripped-down approach contrasts jarringly with the Court’s traditional analysis exploring the justification for Terry stops.58
In United States v. Cortez, the Court required, in determining
whether reasonable suspicion existed to justify a traffic stop, that “the
totality of the circumstances—the whole picture—must be taken
into account.”59 The Court in United States v. Arvizu stated flatly,
the “‘totality of the circumstances’ principle . . . governs the existence
vel non of ‘reasonable suspicion.’”60 In building this “whole picture” to
establish a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity,” an officer would not be
expected to choose to avoid an easily confirmed fact central to her inquiry, such as the identity of the suspect.61 In Alabama v. White, the
54. Id. at 1189–90.
55. Id. at 1190.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1186.
58. The Court has ruled:
The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops—such as the traffic
stop . . . when a law enforcement officer has “a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” . . .
The standard takes into account “the totality of the circumstances—the
whole picture.”
Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2014).
59. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). In United States v. Sokolow,
the Court reiterated, “[W]e must consider ‘the totality of the circumstances—the whole
picture.’ ” 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989).
60. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275 (2002).
61. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417–18.
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Court carefully noted that reasonable suspicion was, “dependent upon
both the content of information possessed by police and its degree
of reliability. Both factors—quantity and quality—are considered.”62
In pursuit of maximizing the quantity and quality of information,
officers carrying out White’s commands would not fail to follow up on
key details, such as their target’s gender or age for identity purposes.63 On the contrary, in faithfully considering the totality of the
circumstances, officers would assemble their cases “fact on fact and
clue on clue.”64 Justice Stevens, concurring in Illinois v. Wardlow,
lauded such a cautious totality of the circumstances approach, warning against the pull offered by a per se rule.65 He cautioned that,
“reasonable suspicion . . . is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to
a neat set of legal rules.”66
Glover’s truncated reasonable suspicion analysis runs afoul of
the Court’s wide-ranging approach to the totality of circumstances
for vehicle stops that the Court mandated in Arvizu.67 Arvizu involved Border Patrol agent Clinton Stoddard’s stop of a minivan
driven by Ralph Arvizu near the U.S.-Mexico border in Arizona.68
Agent Stoddard made the stop because he suspected the minivan of
smuggling.69 When the vehicle stop resulted in Stoddard’s discovery
of a duffle bag of marijuana, Arvizu was charged with intent to distribute marijuana.70 When Arvizu moved to suppress the marijuana
as obtained without reasonable suspicion, the District Court ruled
against him.71 The Court of Appeals reversed, separating out and
labeling some of the facts that Agent Stoddard relied on as providing
“little or no weight in the reasonable-suspicion calculus.”72 Specifically, the Court of Appeals deemed Arvizu’s “slowing down, his failure
to acknowledge Stoddard, the raised position of the children’s knees,
and their odd waving” to carry “little or no weight.”73 The Court of
Appeals then turned to the case’s “remaining factors”—the use of
the road by smugglers, the nearness in time of Arvizu’s trip to the
agents’ scheduled shift change, and the tendency of smugglers to
favor minivans—and found them insufficient to support reasonable
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
See Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1195–96 (2020).
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 419; Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1194 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id.
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002).
Id. at 268, 270–71.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 272.
Id.
Id.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 272.
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suspicion for the stop.74 The Court of Appeals thus ranked the case’s
facts in a hierarchy, isolating certain facts it found valid from other
circumstances it deemed of little value.75
The Arvizu Court found the Court of Appeals’ “methodology” to
be “contrary to our prior decisions.”76 Arvizu declared, “the approach
taken by the Court of Appeals here departs sharply from the teachings of these cases.”77 The Court emphasized, “we have said repeatedly that they must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each
case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and
objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.”78 Arvizu saw the
Court of Appeals’ “evaluation and rejection of seven of the listed factors” as failing to properly apply reasonable suspicion’s totality of
the circumstances analysis.79 Arvizu thus found the Court of Appeals’
effort to “‘clearly delimit’ an officer’s consideration of certain factors”
to be counter to building totality of the circumstances’ “factual ‘mosaic.’”80 When properly performing its own totality of the circumstances analysis of the facts, Arvizu held that Agent Stoddard did
indeed have reasonable suspicion to stop the minivan.81
Glover, in homing in on only two facts while dismissing the need
for Deputy Mehrer to make a visual check of the driver’s age and
gender,82 repeats Arvizu’s Court of Appeals’ mistake by similarly segregating facts into two groups; one set of facts is worthy of law enforcement’s notice, the other is of “little or no weight.”83 The practical
effect of Glover’s reasoning will be to “clearly delimit” an officer’s
consideration to the following facts: 1) the officer will run a license
plate and learn it is linked to the observed vehicle, and 2) the vehicle’s
registered owner has a revoked license.84 Justice Sotomayor, in her
dissent, declared that the Court allowed the stop on “just one key fact:
that the vehicle was owned by someone with a revoked license.”85
Having little incentive to go beyond these minimal facts to check the
driver’s identity, the officer will build a “factual ‘mosaic’” with only
two tiles.86 Such a strangled “analysis breaks from settled doctrine
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 272–73.
Id.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 273.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274.
Id. at 274–75.
Id. at 277.
Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1191 (2020).
Id. at 1190; Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 272.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274; Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1190.
Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1194 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 275.

372

WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.

[Vol. 28:363

and dramatically alters both the quantum and nature of evidence a
State may rely on to prove suspicion.”87
Mandating police to consider all the circumstances of a case,
rather than just two facts, properly causes any traffic stop decision
to focus on “the target’s behavior” rather than “the class to which”
the motorist belongs.88 By turning its back on the totality of the circumstances, Glover openly embraced a categorical rule, denying anyone pigeonholed as “categorically unfit to drive” the full analysis
traditionally given to everyone.89
B. Glover’s Reasoning Discounted Both Reasonable Suspicion
and the Motorist’s Interests Against Seizures of the Person,
Undermining Fourth Amendment Rights
In support of its conclusion that Deputy Mehrer made a lawful
traffic stop, the Court repeatedly discounted the reasonable suspicion standard.90 Glover emphasized that reasonable suspicion was
“considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the
evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.”91
The Court reiterated that reasonable suspicion was a “less demanding” standard that differed from “scientific certainty.”92 In cataloguing
all the standards that reasonable suspicion failed to match,93 Glover
accentuated the relative ease with which this standard could be met.
Such an approach would not have been recognizable to the Terry
Court that allowed police to make such a seizure.94 Terry required that
any officer, in justifying a stop, “to point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion.”95 The Terry Court rejected “anything less,” such as “inarticulate hunches” or an officer’s good faith.96
Even though the initial stop could occur without prior judicial approval, Terry found that the Fourth Amendment itself “bec[ame]
meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct
of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the
more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1194 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1195.
Id. at 1189.
Id. at 1191.
Id. at 1187.
Id. at 1188.
Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1188.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
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circumstances.”97 Similarly, Brown v. Texas expressly noted, “the
Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure must be based on specific,
objective facts indicating that society’s legitimate interests require the
seizure of the particular individual.”98 When juxtaposed with Terry
and Brown, Glover offered an atrophied view of reasonable suspicion.
If the Court diminished the information needed for reasonable
suspicion,99 it reduced to invisibility the rights of the individual in
the balance of interests with the government. Glover readily recognized government rights, deeming the interests in ensuring drivers
were licensed and registered as “vital.”100 The Court explicitly held
the state’s concerns “in mind” when it considered whether Deputy
Mehrer had reasonable suspicion for his stop.101 In contrast, the rights
of the citizen to be free from government seizure were not even mentioned,102 let alone kept in the Court’s mind. This lopsided approach
contrasted jarringly with that taken in Terry, which appreciated
that, “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded,
by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”103
Due to the importance of the individual’s rights, Terry created only
“a narrow exception to the general rule that ‘the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and
seizures through the warrant procedure.’”104
Glover’s blindness to the individual’s interests implicated by a
traffic stop is especially alarming when the practical impact of these
seizures for invalid licenses is explored. Stops for driver’s license
violations have severe and cascading effects on individual interests
that Glover simply failed to fully appreciate.105 Seizures of drivers
with suspended or revoked licenses are part of a greater problem
eroding liberty, particularly of those trapped in poverty.106 As reported in The New York Times,
97. Id. at 21.
98. 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
99. Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1187–88 (2020).
100. Id. at 1188.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
104. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 421 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. See Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1183 (2020).
106. See id.; see also Joseph Shapiro, How Driver’s License Suspensions Unfairly Target
the Poor, NPR (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.npr.org/2015/01/05/372691918/how-drivers-li
cense-suspensions-unfairly-target-the-poor [https://perma.cc/3ZLJ-LHXV]; Richard A.
Oppel, Jr., Being Poor Can Mean Losing a Driver’s License. Not Anymore in Tennessee.,
N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/04/us/drivers-license-ten
nessee.html [https://perma.cc/DZN3-L2QK].

374

WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.

[Vol. 28:363

Millions of Americans have had their driver’s licenses taken away
not because they got drunk and got behind the wheel, or because
they caused an accident and hurt someone: They lost their licenses
because they were too poor to pay court costs or traffic fines, which
can run into hundreds and sometimes thousands of dollars.107

License invalidation is hardly a rare practice, as about “40 states have
such laws on the books that suspend or revoke licenses of drivers.”108
Failure to pay a ticket for a broken taillight can result in the loss of
a driver’s license for two years.109 Laws suspending or revoking
driver’s licenses disproportionally affect communities of color; in
Milwaukee, “[t]wo out of three African-American men . . . of working
age, don’t have a driver’s license.”110 Premal Dharia, director of litigation for Civil Rights Corps, has argued that drivers who have lost
driving privileges cannot see family, go to church, attend school, or
pursue employment to pay off the debts prohibiting driving in the
first place.111 The adverse impact on employment stems from the
lack of any alternative transportation because busses fail to serve
inner-city neighborhoods.112 A vicious circle thus traps individuals
because, “You drive to work so you can pay the fines, but then you
get pulled over, so you owe even more.”113
Further, Glover’s dismissal of the intrusion on individual rights
took no account of those innocent—fully licensed—drivers who are
properly in possession of an unlicensed driver’s car. Since Glover has
relieved officers making a revoked license traffic stop from discerning the age or gender of the driver, there will be times when police
will seize properly licensed drivers who are committing no wrong.114
Even if, “[w]hen you see a car coming down the street, your common
sense tells you that the registered owner may well be behind the
107. Oppel, supra note 106.
108. Id.
109. Shapiro, supra note 106.
110. Id.
111. Oppel, supra note 106.
112. As one person who lacked a license noted, “It hinders you because most jobs are
not in the inner city nowadays. And they get pushed far back, and the buses don’t go out
there. So the inner-city jobs that we have are not able to provide for our families that we
have and to provide for ourselves.” Shapiro, supra note 106.
113. Torie Atkinson, A Fine Scheme: How Municipal Fines Become Crushing Debt in
the Shadow of the New Debtors’ Prisons, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 189, 218–19 (2016).
114. In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor noted, “The consequence of the majority’s approach is to absolve officers from any responsibility to investigate the identity of a driver
where feasible.” Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1196 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
The Glover Court had relieved police of this responsibility even though there have been
“countless . . . instances where officers have been able to ascertain the identity of a
driver from a distance and make out their approximate age and gender.” Id.
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wheel,” there will be times for each officer following Glover when he
or she stops a licensed driver.115 The cumulative impact of the Court’s
rule could amount to “significant law enforcement activity.”116 The
Court has previously noted, “the extent of police-citizen contact involving automobiles will be substantially greater than police-citizen
contact in a home or office” due to the “extensive regulation of motor
vehicles and traffic.”117 Therefore, many motorists, doing nothing more
than driving with a valid license, will be seized unnecessarily, amounting to “thousands upon thousands of petty indignities.”118 As Justice
Stevens noted in Maryland v. Wilson, where the Court held that
officers could automatically order out all passengers from a lawfully
stopped vehicle, “countless citizens who cherish individual liberty”
will suffer the burden of a pointless seizure where they will have to
convince an often skeptical officer that he or she has stopped the
wrong person.119
In contrast, the “vital” government interest in removing unlicensed drivers from the road as “unfit to drive” might not be as vital
as Glover believed.120 For the offenses triggering license revocation,
Glover mentioned “involuntary manslaughter, vehicular homicide,
battery, reckless driving, fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer.”121 However, as noted by Justice Sotomayor in her dissent, “the
grounds for revocation include offenses unrelated to driving fitness,
such as using a license to unlawfully buy alcohol.”122 Furthermore,
many wrongs resulting in the loss of driving privileges are relatively
minor.123 “Kansas and many other states began suspending licenses
115. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1191 (Kagan, J., concurring).
116. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 418 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Wilson,
the Court declared, “In this case we consider whether the rule of Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
that a police officer may as a matter of course order the driver of a lawfully stopped car
to exit his vehicle, extends to passengers as well. We hold that it does.” Id. at 410.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 417, 419.
119. Id. at 410, 419. The point made by Justice Stevens, dissenting in Maryland v.
Wilson, who criticized the Court’s ruling enabling police to automatically order passengers
out of lawfully stopped vehicles, aptly applies to Glover’s holding:
[T]he potential daily burden on thousands of innocent citizens is obvious.
That burden may well be “minimal” in individual cases . . . . But countless
citizens who cherish individual liberty and are offended, embarrassed, and
sometimes provoked by arbitrary official commands may well consider the
burden to be significant.
Wilson, 519 U.S. at 419 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1188–89.
121. Id. at 1189.
122. Id. at 1198 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
123. See Brief of Amici Curiae Fines and Fees Justice Center et al. in Support of
Respondent at 6, Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1187, No. 18-556 (2020) [hereinafter
Brief of Amici Curiae Fines and Fees Justice Center].
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for failure to appear in court, failure to pay parking tickets, failure
to pay court fines and fees.”124 Motorists have been denied their licenses for truancy, graffiti, being a minor who attempts to purchase
tobacco,125 and defaulting on student loans.126 Moreover, government
interests in suspending or revoking licenses might be distorted by
budgetary considerations.127 States and municipalities have begun
“increasingly to rely on revenue generated from fines and fees.”128
The collections from motorists denied driving privileges have become big business, as “over 7 million Americans have had their licenses suspended for failure to pay court or administrative debt.”129
In urging the gravity of government interests in pursuing those
driving without a valid license, the Court made an argument that
the states themselves seem increasingly likely to dismiss.130 In 2020,
Illinois passed bipartisan legislation, the License to Work Act, stopping “the state’s practice of suspending driver’s licenses over most
non-moving violations, like unpaid parking tickets.”131 Illinois’ governor, J.B. Pritzker, noted that his state had come to recognize that,
“suspending licenses for having too many unpaid tickets or fines or
fees doesn’t necessarily make a person pay the bill, but it does mean
the people who are suffering from this don’t have a way to pay.”132
Governor Pritzker continued, “If you’re living below or near the poverty line and you’re looking at a choice between your unpaid parking
tickets or your kid’s medicine or your family’s next meal, well, that’s
no choice at all.”133 The Illinois law provided a mechanism for “automatic reinstatement of the driver’s licenses of more than 50,000 people
whose licenses were suspended for unpaid tickets, fees or fines.”134
124. Id.
125. JON CARNEGIE & ROBERT EGER, III, REASONS FOR DRIVER LICENSE SUSPENSION,
RECIDIVISM, AND CRASH INVOLVEMENT AMONG DRIVERS WITH SUSPENDED/REVOKED
LICENSES, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRANSP. & SAFETY ADMIN. 7 (Jan. 2009). The study’s authors
do not distinguish between suspension and revocation, instead speaking of “drivers that
are suspended/revoked.” Id. at I.
126. Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondent at 21, Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1187 (2020) (No. 18-556).
127. See Brief of Amici Curiae Fines and Fees Justice Center, supra note 123, at 6.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 7.
130. Shelby Bremer, Pritzker Signs Law Ending Driver’s License Suspensions over
Unpaid Parking Tickets, NBC NEWS CHI. (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.nbcchicago.com
/news/local/chicago-politics/pritzker-signs-law-ending-drivers-license-suspensions-over
-unpaid-parking-tickets/2202964 [https://perma.cc/42E2-3Z3T]; California No Longer Will
Suspend Driver’s Licenses For Traffic Fines, L.A. TIMES (June 29, 2017, 9:50 AM) [hereinafter California No Longer], https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-driver-license
-fees-20170629-story.html?_amp=true [https://perma.cc/P96F-TXUR].
131. Bremer, supra note 130.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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Illinois is not alone, for California also stopped the practice of denying
driving privileges for unpaid traffic fines.135 California State Senator
Bob Hertzberg argued that the new law would “help ensure people’s
lives are not derailed by traffic tickets.”136
Thus, in allowing police to stop cars owned by persons with
revoked licenses, the Court aided the enforcement of a practice that
some states, at least, are increasingly reluctant to perform. In making
such a ruling, Glover had to ignore the many real burdens drivers’
license traffic stops place on the daily struggles people face.137 Rather
than “common,” the “sense” the Court used in reaching this result
seems not only exceptional, but unique.138
C. Glover Added a New Element of “When the Officer Lacks
Information Negating an Inference” to Terry’s Justification
Analysis, Shifting the Burden of Proof to the Motorist
Glover held that an officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment by stopping a vehicle after “learning that the registered owner
has a revoked driver’s license,” so long as that officer “lacks information negating an inference that the owner is the driver of the vehicle.”139 In so ruling, the Court essentially created a presumption that
any vehicle whose owner has a revoked license can be stopped. In
the Court’s formulation, the Glover presumption can only be rebutted
by the motorist themselves and only after the vehicle is stopped.140
This means that any innocent driver is only able to rebut the presumption after the injury—the unnecessary seizure—occurs. Justice
Sotomayor urged that Glover, in allowing officers to make a stop without the bother of checking the sex, age, or other identifiable characteristics of the driver, “unnecessarily reduce[d] the State’s burden
of proof.”141 Rather, the Court shifted the burden of proof from the
government to the individual once the officer runs the license plate.142
This shift admittedly will likely happen with only a small fraction
of innocent drivers because many motorists probably will be the vehicle’s owner and therefore have a revoked license. However, there
will be a not inconsiderable number of blameless drivers seized143
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

California No Longer, supra note 130.
Id.
See Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1194 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1189–90.
Id. at 1186.
Id.
Id. at 1194 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1194 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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because the officer could not be bothered to check the characteristics
of the motorist for even the most basic identification purposes before
stopping. The cumulative effect of Glover’s ruling could be the unnecessary and avoidable seizure of thousands of faultless motorists.
Glover’s seize-first-ask-questions-later approach fails to heed Justice
Brandeis’ warning that the “makers of our Constitution” had “conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone—the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.”144 After Glover, a motorist who borrows a car runs the risk of
losing the fundamental right to be let alone simply because someone
else’s license had been revoked.
Moreover, embedded within the Court’s holding is the establishment of authority based on ignorance; in certain cases, an officer
who does not know that a vehicle’s driver is not its owner will have
more seizure power than the officer who does know.145 Glover thus
created a perverse incentive for police. Rather than pursue a full
investigation of the “totality of circumstances” upon which reasonable suspicion is firmly based, Glover incentivizes officers to obtain
the minimum facts needed to bolster a stop—and then steer clear of
looking further. The Court’s ruling,146 encouraging officers to limit
investigations, will leave police in perilous situations borne of ignorance. Empowerment by ignorance seems all the more troubling
in light of the tragic consequences that can arise from a traffic stop.147
National Public Radio, in investigating police shootings, found “[m]ore
than a quarter” of police killings of civilians in their study “occurred
during traffic stops.”148 One commentator asserted that since, “[s]tatistically, the traffic stop scenario is one of the most dangerous activities a uniformed police officer undertakes,” there is “no such thing
as a routine [traffic] stop.”149 Accordingly, “police officers perceive
the enforcement of traffic infractions as potentially a life-and-death
scenario.”150 Shootings resulting from officers suffering mistakes of
fact about the situation they face are so prevalent that they have
144. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
145. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1190.
146. Id. at 1191.
147. Id. at 1190.
148. Cheryl W. Thompson, Fatal Police Shootings Of Unarmed Black People Reveal
Troubling Patterns, NPR (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/01/25/956177021
/fatal-police-shootings-of-unarmed-black-people-reveal-troubling-patterns [https://perma
.cc/5K7S-KQWU].
149. Benjamin Jaqua, Policing the Police: Reexamining the Constitutional Implications
of Traffic Stops, 50 IND. L. REV. 345, 349 (2016).
150. Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African Americans to Police
Violence?, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 179 (2016).
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earned a technical term, “threat perception failure.”151 The Court,
therefore, does neither officers nor motorists any favors by increasing the likelihood that officers will stumble into a situation without
gathering all the facts they could.
Further, the Court’s dangerous innovation in shifting the burden for seizures simply defies precedent.152 As Justice Sotomayor
reminded the Court, “The State bears the burden of justifying a seizure.”153 In Florida v. Royer, the Court explicitly ruled, “[i]t is the
State’s burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on
the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope
and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.”154
Brown v. Texas reiterated that it is the government that must base
its seizure “on specific, objective facts indicating that society’s legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular individual.”155 In
requiring law enforcement to justify its intrusions, Brown warned
against “arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of
officers in the field.”156
Moreover, instead of lessening an officer’s duties to investigate,
a sounder Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” standard would promote due diligence by encouraging an officer to gather as much
information as they reasonably can. Demanding less and less from
officers undermines the professionalism of law enforcement and erodes
Fourth Amendment protections. Glover’s diminution of the measure
for reasonableness precipitated a telling conflict between the Court
and Sotomayor in how to assess reasonable suspicion.157 Justice
Sotomayor urged that, “reasonable suspicion eschews judicial common
sense in favor of the perspectives and inferences of a reasonable officer
viewing ‘the facts through the lens of his police experience and expertise.’”158 Rather than weigh reasonable suspicion through the
eyes of an ordinary person, or even a judge, reasonable suspicion
had to “be seen and weighed . . . as understood by those versed in
the field of law enforcement.”159 Glover rejected any requirement
151. David A. Klinger & Lee Ann Slocum, Critical Assessment of an Analysis of a
Journalistic Compendium of Citizens Killed by Police Gunfire, Criminology, Criminality,
and Public Policy, 16 AM. SOC’Y OF CRIMINOLOGY 350 (2017). The authors argued that
“threat perception failure” was a “problematic” term in part because it implied that “shootings of unarmed suspects are, by definition, mistakes.” Id.
152. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1194 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
155. 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
156. Id.
157. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1189–90, 1194–95 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 1195.
159. Id.
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that a reasonable suspicion determination be grounded in an officer’s “law enforcement training or experience.”160 Disparaging Justice Sotomayor’s limit as “def[ying] the ‘common sense’ understanding
of common sense,”161 the Court instead insisted that police be able
to make “factual inferences based on the commonly held knowledge
they have acquired in their everyday lives.”162 Otherwise, officers
would be doomed to become “bifurcated persons.”163
The real reason, however, for an officer being in danger of splitting into two persons is because the Court has been characterizing
police in two dramatically different ways, depending on the needs
of the particular case.164 At times, the Court has placed police on the
pedestal of the respected expert, having access to experience and
expertise beyond mere laypersons.165 At other times, the Court excuses officers who make mistakes just like any other human.166 The
only consistency in the use of these conflicting standards is that the
criterion the Court chooses tends to benefit the officer.
For a half-century, the Court’s reasoning has often strengthened
the officer’s position by promoting the expertise that comes with a law
enforcement background.167 In 1968, in Terry, the Court reviewed
Detective Martin McFadden’s resume, finding it relevant that “he
had been a policeman for 39 years and a detective for 35 and that he
had been assigned to patrol this vicinity of downtown Cleveland for
shoplifters and pickpockets for 30 years.”168 The Court specified that
this officer had “developed routine habits of observation over the
years and that he would ‘stand and watch people or walk and watch
people at many intervals of the day.’”169 Terry therefore pointedly
viewed the officer’s decision to stop the suspects in light of his “30
years’ experience . . . in this same neighborhood.”170 The Court explicitly stated, as part of its holding finding Detective McFadden’s
seizure and frisk reasonable, that the lawfulness of official action
would be measured “in light of [the officer’s] experience that criminal activity may be afoot.”171 Indeed, Terry concluded that, “It would
160. Id. at 1189.
161. Id. at 1189–90.
162. Id. at 1190.
163. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1190.
164. Compare United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981), with Heien v. North
Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 61 (2014).
165. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
166. Heien, 574 U.S. at 61.
167. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5 (1968); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
563–64 (1980); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 (1975).
168. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 23.
171. Id. at 30.
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have been poor police work indeed for an officer of 30 years’ experience in the detection of thievery from stores in this same neighborhood to have failed to investigate this behavior further.”172 Thus, in
creating the authority to stop and frisk, Terry embedded directly into
its reasonable suspicion analysis the idea that an officer’s ability to
establish evidence for the stop increases with each year an officer
works on the force.173
The Court repeatedly promoted officers’ experience and expertise in finding individualized suspicion in a variety of contexts.174 In
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the Court enabled agents on the
border to rely on “previous experience with alien traffic” in considering facts for performing traffic stops of vehicles.175 In United States v.
Ortiz, a case where Border Patrol officers found three undocumented
persons in the trunk of a car,176 the Court declared that agents were
“entitled to draw reasonable inferences” using “their knowledge of
the area and their prior experience with aliens and smugglers.”177
In United States v. Mendenhall, a case where Drug Enforcement
Administration agents stopped a traveler in an airport, the Court
admonished, “it is important to recall that a trained law enforcement
agent may be ‘able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer.’”178
Mendenhall reiterated that an “agent’s knowledge of the methods
used in recent criminal activity and the characteristics of persons
engaged in such illegal practices” contributed to forming reasonable
suspicion to support a stop.179
In United States v. Cortez, a case where Border Patrol officers
were tracking the footprints of a smuggler of undocumented persons
in the Arizona desert, the Court explained law enforcement’s power
to see reasonable suspicion which would be invisible to normal folks.
Cortez, extolling the ability of “a trained officer” to draw “inferences
and deductions that might well elude an untrained person,” required
that evidence be weighed, “not in terms of library analysis by scholars,
but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.”180
172. Id. at 23.
173. See id.
174. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884–85 (1975); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547–48, 563 (1980); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897
(1975).
175. 422 U.S. at 884–85.
176. Id. at 892.
177. Id. at 897.
178. 446 U.S. at 563.
179. Id. at 564, 563.
180. 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). The Court would again rely on an officer’s ability to form
inferences that “might well elude an untrained person” in two more cases. United States
v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); Pennsylvania v. Dunlap, 555 U.S. 964, 964 (2008).
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Cortez made a point of emphasizing, “the imperative of recognizing
that, when used by trained law enforcement officers, objective facts,
meaningless to the untrained, can be combined with permissible
deductions from such facts to form a legitimate basis for suspicion
of a particular person and for action on that suspicion.”181 The deep
mental groove which the Court had created to reward officers for
their professional experience in forming reasonable suspicion did not
go unnoticed.182 Justice Rehnquist, in Florida v. Royer, involving the
stop of a drug courier at an airport, recognized, “This Court . . . has
repeatedly emphasized that a trained police officer may draw inferences and make deductions that could elude any untrained person
observing the same conduct.”183 The Court referenced law enforcement’s expertise in assessing suspicious behavior in another airport
case, United States v. Sokolow, where officers relied on a Drug Enforcement Agency “drug courier profile” to stop a suspect.184 Weighing the “evidentiary significance” of the facts “as seen by a trained
agent,” Sokolow held that reasonable suspicion existed that the suspect was transporting illegal drugs.185
The Court once again relied on the experience of officials in
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, a case where customs inspectors suspected a passenger from Bogota Columbia of being a “balloon
swallower.”186 Officials held the passenger for nearly sixteen hours, as
she “exhibited symptoms of discomfort consistent with ‘heroic efforts
to resist the usual calls of nature.’”187 In considering the government’s
seizure, Montoya de Hernandez lamented that “alimentary canal
smuggling” gave agents “no external signs” of illegality.188 The Court,
in finding reasonable suspicion to support the seizure, remarked that
it “need not belabor the facts” because the “trained customs inspectors had encountered many alimentary canal smugglers.”189 Finally,
in Navarette v. California, the Court collected together the aggregate experience of law enforcement in general to find a stop of a
motorist reasonable based on “the accumulated experience of thousands of officers.”190
181. 449 U.S. at 419.
182. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 525, n.5 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
183. Id.
184. 490 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 10, 11.
186. 473 U.S. 531, 534 (1985).
187. Id. at 535.
188. Id. at 541.
189. Id. at 542.
190. 572 U.S. 393, 402–03 (2014) (relying, later in the opinion, on the experience of
“many officers.”).
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Thus, the Court has repeatedly ruled that the experience and
expertise possessed by law enforcement professionals enable them
to mine reasonable suspicion or probable cause from facts which would
leave a layperson ignorant “that criminal activity may be afoot.”191
Police, by their hard-won specialized knowledge, have earned the
benefit of the Court giving an appreciative nod to the know-how only
they have.192 However, when police stumble, the Court sometimes
suffers amnesia, failing to hold officers to the higher standard that
should come with professional expertise.193 The most glaring example
of the Court’s acceptance of officers as just regular folks is the case,
Heien v. North Carolina.194 In Heien, a Surry County Sheriff’s deputy
noticed that a car he was following on the interstate had a “faulty
right brake light.”195 Believing the broken brake light violated the
law, the sheriff stopped the vehicle, driven by Nicholas Brady Heien,
ultimately finding cocaine inside the car.196 Heien was arrested and
convicted.197 On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals, focusing
on the statute’s reference to “a stop lamp” in “the singular” ruled,
“that a vehicle is required to have only one working brake light—
which Heien’s vehicle indisputably did.”198 Therefore, the sheriff, in
pulling over a vehicle for one broken tail light, made a mistake
about the very law he was supposed to enforce.
The Court found “the officer’s mistake about the brake-light law
was reasonable,” and therefore concluded that “the stop in this case
was lawful under the Fourth Amendment.”199 Heien noted that the
Court had previously found “searches and seizures based on mistakes of fact can be reasonable.”200 Therefore, the Court shrugged its
shoulders and declared, “reasonable men make mistakes of law, too,
and such mistakes are no less compatible with the concept of reasonable suspicion.”201 Here, the Court, instead of analyzing the case
in terms of the professional law enforcement official who can divine
things “meaningless to the untrained,”202 now spoke of ordinary
“men.”203 Heien declared that whether, “the facts turn out to be not
what was thought, or the law turns out to be not what was thought,
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000).
See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 57 (2014).
Id.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 59.
Heien, 574 U.S. at 57.
Id. at 61.
Id.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419 (1981).
Heien, 574 U.S. at 61.
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the result is the same,” seeing no difference between a mistake of fact,
involving circumstances newly presented to the officer, and a mistake
of law, involving the rules upon which an officer is specially trained
and which he is supposed to enforce daily.204 As for the officer’s special experience and expertise, the Court made no mention.205
The Court also readily lowered the bar for police performance
in the warrant context, despite the existence of its own warrant
requirement that, “police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure.”206 Specifically, when police sought a warrant by filling out
an application for a magistrate’s review, the Court, in Illinois v.
Gates, wished to avoid the “built-in subtleties” of its earlier case law.207
Gates aimed to discourage courts from applying a “grudging or
negative attitude” in their review of warrants because the affidavits
in the warrant applications were “normally drafted by nonlawyers
in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation.”208 Indeed, the
Court’s race to the bottom extended beyond its assessment of the actions of police to include those of the magistrates reviewing the applications.209 Gates asserted, “search and arrest warrants long have
been issued by persons who are neither lawyers nor judges, and who
certainly do not remain abreast of each judicial refinement of the
nature of ‘probable cause.’”210 Thus, the Court needed to craft a rule
that would account for the “nontechnical, common-sense judgments
of laymen.”211 Thus, when it benefitted officers, even in the allimportant context of warrants, the Court viewed police as hurried
laypersons unable to grasp legal subtleties, despite any training,
experience, or expertise.
The Court’s tolerance for government mistakes extended to the
failure to maintain updated computer information on arrest warrants.212 In Arizona v. Evans, an officer recovered marijuana as a result of a search incident to arrest of a stopped motorist.213 The arrest
was based solely on a police record—on the officer’s patrol car computer—“indicating the existence of an outstanding arrest warrant.”214
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). The warrant requirement is alive and well
today, as demonstrated by the Court’s recent admonition to police to “get a warrant.”
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014).
207. 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).
208. Id. at 235–36.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 235.
211. Id. at 235–36.
212. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1995).
213. Id. at 4.
214. Id.
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No such warrant existed to support the arrest, however, since the
warrant had been quashed 17 days before the arrest.215 Evans refused
to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless arrest, finding there was “no indication that the arresting officer was not acting
objectively reasonably when he relied upon the police computer record.”216 Evans made this ruling in spite of the fact that Justice
Ginsburg warned in her dissent that such mistakes in computer records could result in “Orwellian mischief.”217 The Court again stuck
by law enforcement seventeen years later, when Orwell came knocking
in Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, a case in which an arrestee
was subjected to two strip searches based on a faulty statewide computer database indicating a warrant still existed for his arrest.218
Perhaps the Court strayed the farthest from its portrayal of the
officer as a trained professional with specialized experience and expertise in Herring v. United States, a case where police recovered
drugs and a pistol from a stopped motorist.219 The warrant that served
as the basis for the arrest and search in Herring had been recalled
five months before the stop of the motorist.220 The Court refused to
employ the exclusionary rule for this computer error, reasoning,
“[t]he extent to which the exclusionary rule is justified . . . varies
with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct.”221 To trigger
the exclusionary rule, police conduct had to be “flagrant” or “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances
recurring or systemic negligence.”222 Absent this egregious behavior,
police would not be punished with exclusion. Herring, finding such
a flagrant violation missing when executing a five-month-old warrant, ruled the jury should see the evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment.223
Glover, in allowing police to stop vehicles without the need to
make a reasonable effort to identify the motorist,224 becomes the
latest case to expect less from law enforcement. In allowing stops
without a full investigation, the Court is setting up police to commit
215. Id.
216. Id. at 3–4, 15–16.
217. Id. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
218. 566 U.S. 318, 323–24 (2012). The Florence Court held, “Even assuming all the
facts in favor of petitioner, the search procedures at the Burlington County Detention
Center and the Essex County Correctional Facility struck a reasonable balance between
inmate privacy and the needs of the institutions.” Id. at 339.
219. 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009).
220. Id. at 138.
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223. Herring declared, “We hold that in these circumstances the jury should not be
barred from considering all the evidence.” Id. at 137.
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more errors, which it will likely choose to review by the ordinary
mistake measure rather than the expert officer standard. Glover’s
choice might not bode well for maintaining professionalism and adaptation to change, particularly in light of increasing police problems.225
In New York v. Quarles, a case in which the Court created a “public
safety” exception to Miranda v. Arizona’s requirement that officers
provide warnings to a suspect in custodial interrogation, the Court
spoke of “a kaleidoscopic situation such as the one confronting these
officers, where spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual
is necessarily the order of the day.”226 In Glover, the Court has sadly
created the possibility for many more such kaleidoscopic situations.
CONCLUSION
Is it truly too much to ask police to fully investigate the identity
of a driver before seizing him? Such a duty would not have seemed
too onerous to the Court in the past. Arvizu noted that it had “said
repeatedly” that the assessment of reasonable suspicion mandated
viewing the “totality of the circumstances” of each stop to determine
whether there existed an objective basis “for suspecting legal wrongdoing.”227 Cortez declared that such careful analysis required “an
assessment of the whole picture.”228 The Court has previously expected officers to form reasonable suspicion by “piecing together the
information at their disposal.”229 After Glover, however, police need
not collect all the information “at their disposal” because the Court
has now ruled that officers need not bother to simply glance at the
driver’s window to check a motorist’s age or gender.230 Armed with
ignorance about the true identity of the driver, police may now stop
a motorist for a violation of a law that is itself premised on the
validity, or lack thereof, of identification—a driver’s license.
In spite of its history of deliberately and repeatedly avoiding
reducing reasonable suspicion to “a neat set of legal rules,” and of
previously refusing to view factors “in isolation from each other,”
Glover now enables officers to intrude on drivers by forming as little
as two facts.231 In reaching its ruling, the Court spoke of “common
sense” and reasonable inferences “made by ordinary people on a daily
225. Id. at 1190.
226. 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984).
227. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).
228. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
229. Id. at 418–19.
230. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1186, 1196 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
231. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274; Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695–96 (1996);
Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1190.
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basis.”232 Unfortunately, Glover’s ruling occurred in a context in which
something else occurs on “a daily basis”—police kill three people a
day.233 There is a likelihood that many of these killings are the result of surprise or confusion, and therefore are due to a lack of information. Fourth Amendment reasonableness should therefore
include a mandate that members of law enforcement make a reasonable effort to gather all the “information at their disposal” before
making a seizure of a person.234 This should hardly be a controversial
proposal. Indeed, since 1985, the Court has explicitly made an officer’s
diligence in pursuing an investigation part of its Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis.235 It seems to be “common sense” that
officers exercise reasonable diligence to get all the facts necessary
before intruding upon “the right most valued by civilized men,” the
“right to be let alone.”236 Terry, the case giving Deputy Mehrer the
authority to seize a person in the first place, declared, “No right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless
by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”237 Isn’t such a sacred
right worth an officer’s glance in the driver’s window?
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